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1 Nagel [4, p. 338] explained that ‘‘reduction [. . .] is the explanation of a theory or a
set of experimental laws established in one area of inquiry, by a theory usually though
not invariably formulated for some other domain’’. Reduction is therefore deﬁned
through the logical idea according to which a theory can be a deﬁnitional extension of
another [4, p. 351].Christophe Schinckus
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Multiple realizabilityStylized facts are persistent macro-regularities which cannot be described in terms of microeconomic
theory. Through the argument of multiple realizability, this methodological paper claims that a top down
agent-based econophysics can contribute to a better understanding of complex economic systems in two
ways: on the one hand, it clariﬁes the gap between micro and macro scales by proving an algorithmic
derivability of the latter; and on the other hand, this modelling provides microfoundations (and then
potentially an economic meaning) to macro-patterns usually identiﬁed in the observation of these com-
plex systems.
 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).For several years economics has been facing with an accumula-
tion of ‘‘stylized facts’’ (persistent macro-regularities which cannot
be described in terms of microeconomic theory [1]) – among the
most studied stylized facts, one can mention: heavy tails of ﬁnan-
cial distributions, volatility clustering, volume/volatility correla-
tion, absence of autocorrelation etc (see 2 for a review literature
on these empirical facts). All these statistical phenomena cannot
be expressed in economic mainstream terms based on a micro-
scopic approach in which macro-scale is a mere aggregation of
micro-components. Buchanan [1] emphasized similarities between
stylized facts and phenomena usually studied in statistical physics
explaining why some physicists decided to develop what we today
call ‘‘econophysics’’. Although all econophysical literatures are not
dedicated to stylized facts, the vast majority of these works focus
on macro-regularities observed in complex economic systems [1].
Econophysics is a phenomenological ﬁeld mainly based on the
description of macro scale of economic systems whose micro-
interactions are judged to be too complex to be reduced (and then
deﬁned) through a mere analytical form [3]. Because econophysi-
cists assume that micro-interactions are too complex to be cap-
tured, they do not provide a framework compatible with the
classical idea1 of reduction. When they refer to agents, econophysi-
cists implicitly assume the agents’ behaviour is random and the
result is mathematically analogous to a reaction of diffusion modelin physics. This phenomenological methodology reducing the agents’
heterogeneity to a collective activity on the macro-scale preserves a
mystery gap between the micro and the macro levels. Although
econophysicists acknowledge the existence of micro-interactions,
this concept often appears to be a ﬁller term in order to characterize
the fact that ‘‘something is moving’’ between units whose
behaviours generate macroscopic results.
By doing so, econophysicists are in line with a micro-indeter-
minism inducing, by coarse-graining, a macro-determinism.
This ‘‘coarse-graining situation’’ is well-known in hard science
but not so common in social sciences in which agents are endowed
with intentions. The impossibility to deﬁne the high number of
microscopic conﬁgurations for individuals implicitly refers to what
we call ‘‘the multiple realizability argument’’ which acknowledges
that a macro property can emerge from a diversity of micro-prop-
erties. ‘‘Because the higher-level properties are multiple realizable,
the mapping from lower to higher is many-to-one’’ [Sober, 5,
p. 545]. The author explained that multiple realizability argument
does not deny that higher-level properties are determined by
lower-level ones but it rather refutes the reductionist idea that
higher conﬁguration results from a speciﬁc (causal) conﬁguration
of micro-properties. When this argument is applied to social sci-
ences, it is called ‘‘multi-desiderability’’ [5] in order to emphasize
the complexity of individual psychology of agents. In the same
vein, Batterman [7] explained that multiple realizability is an
appropriate conceptual framework for describing the occurrence
of universal statistical macro patterns in social sciences, ‘‘The mul-
tiple realizability of the properties of the special sciences such as
psychology [or social sciences] is best understood as a kind of uni-
versality, where ‘universality’ is used in the technical sense one
ﬁnds in the physics literature’’ [Batterman, 7, p. 115]. Some authors
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reduction because the description of the macro-level (reduced the-
ory) cannot integrate a unique functional deﬁnition of the micro-
states (whose behaviour cannot be captured through a mere ana-
lytical form). In other words, the theory describing the macro-level
cannot be presented as a unique deﬁnitional extension of the
reducing one. However, as Sober [5] it, multiple realizability, gives
no argument against classical (Nagelian) reduction because the
uniqueness of derivability between reduced and reducing theories
is not a necessary condition. The derivability is, as a corollary, only
a sufﬁcient condition making this argument of multiple
realizability compatible with reduction. This possibility can be
looked on as an opportunity for econophysicists. Indeed, a plausi-
ble top-down derivability paves the way for a combination of
strictly phenomenological econophysics dealing with macro-pat-
terns (stylized facts) with an approach such as agent-based model-
ling which can clarify the gap between macro and micro scales of
economic complex systems. The necessity to give a meaning to this
gap between micro and macro scales is a key point for the accep-
tance of econophysics in a micro-based economics for which ‘‘the
implications of this new literature [econophysics] for economic
complexity are still very unclear [today]’’ [Durlauf, 8, p. 232].
This methodological paper claims that econophysicists have all
conceptual tools they need to meet usual expectations in economic
modelling (i.e. necessity to provide micro-foundations). More
speciﬁcally, a top down agent based econophysics can meet this
necessity to provide micro-foundations to emerging macro-
patterns. Indeed, once a macro-pattern is phenomenologically
identiﬁed in the study of a complex economic system, a model
based on an algorithmically generated behaviour of individual
market participants quantitatively reproduces the initial macro
power law. The method is based on computerized simulations of
a large number of learning decision-makers and it provides a
speciﬁc way to study micro-interactions that cause macro-proper-
ties. In opposition to agent-based economics, individual incentives
are not the constraint for the calibration of micro-interactions, the
real constraint for this category of works is actually deﬁned by the
initial macro-laws modellers would like to reproduce through the
agent-based modelling. The macro-pattern initially identiﬁed forthis ﬁnancial system will then be constraining for the calibration
of the rules governing interactions between agents, as Feng and
al [9, p. 8388] explained it, ‘‘the interaction strength between
agents need to be adjusted with agent population size or
interaction structure to sustain fat tails in return distributions
[i.e. power-law]’’. When agent-based modelling generates the
same regularities then those observed by econophysicists; it
provides micro-foundations to the statistical regularities that
emerge at the macro-level of economic systems (such as stylized
facts). A top-down agent-based approach can therefore be consid-
ered as a complementary ﬁeld with a strictly statistical approach.
Moreover, a top down agent-based modelling can contribute to
econophysics in two ways: on the one hand, it clariﬁes the gap
between micro and macro scales by proving an algorithmic deriv-
ability2 of the latter; and on the other hand, this modelling provides
micro-foundations (and then potentially an economic meaning) to
macro-patterns. Aware of this situation, some econophysicists [9]
initiated a ‘‘top-down agent-based econophysics’’ but the movement
is still at its infancy in the study of stylized facts the vast majority of
econophysicists using agent-based modelling do not work on styl-
ized facts allowing them to use a classical bottom-up approach
(see [3] for further information about that literature).
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